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Counterfeit Drugs: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

Albany J of Science & Technology (2006)

Kevin Outterson ∗ & Ryan Smith ♦
When I chose the title, Counterfeit Drugs: The Good, the Bad and the
Ugly, 1 some of my colleagues at this symposium blanched. They
understood counterfeit drugs as Bad and Ugly, but resisted categorizing any
counterfeit drug as Good. This article is intended to be provocative,
challenging some of the conventional wisdom concerning counterfeit drugs.
We start with the fact that reports about the scope of pharmaceutical
counterfeiting are remarkably anecdotal rather than empirical. As a
professor once chided me, the plural of anecdote is not data. The FDA and
the WHO must undertake comprehensive market surveillance to establish
the true scope of the counterfeiting problem.
We also must speak more clearly about counterfeit drugs, with an improved
lexicon. It is misleading to pretend that cross-border drugs from Canada and
contaminated water passed off as erythropoietin (Epoetin alfa) by criminal
gangs are similar issues. They have quite distinct causes, effects and
indicated solutions.
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, this article identifies the
underlying cause of drug counterfeiting as the legal system of intellectual
property laws. We briefly explore alternative systems which would
accomplish recovery of R&D expenditures without the patent rents which
attract counterfeiting.

∗ Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. I am grateful to Albany Law School for the
invitation to present at this symposium, and to the symposium participants for their excellent comments and questions.
I also thank my research assistant, David Davis, for his work.
♦ J.D. candidate, West Virginia University College of Law.
1 With apologies to Clint Eastwood and Sergio Leone (1966).

I.

The Database on Counterfeit Medicines is Unreliable

Statistics about counterfeit medicines are everywhere: press reports, 2 WHO
fact sheets, 3 FDA press releases, 4 U.S. government task forces, 5 law review
articles, 6 medical journals, 7 and international trade associations. 8
Statistics are one thing; useful statistics are quite another. Empirical,
reliable and transparent statistics about drug counterfeiting are virtually nonexistent. In an excellent article, Robert Cockburn and his co-authors
examined the paucity of transparent data and called for mandatory public
reporting. 9 Drug companies are reluctant to release information that might
harm the marketing efforts for their branded products. 10 The only
comprehensive global collection point for counterfeit drug information is the
Pharmaceutical Security Institute (PSI), a trade organization established by
the security directors of 14 major global drug companies. 11 In October
2004, one of us (KO) asked PSI for access to their database as a researcher,
but was told they do not release information to the public. Instead, I was
directed to the FDA, WHO or news reports. 12 The “data” begins to resemble
a house of mirrors as each group cites the other as the source of the
information.

2 Associated Press, FDA: Al-Qaida could poison medicines, Aug. 12, 2004, available at
http://msnbe.msn.com/id/5682351 (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
3 World Health Organization. FACT SHEET NO. 275: SUBSTANDARD AND COUNTERFEIT MEDICINES (November 2003),
available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/2003/fs 275/en.
4 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FY 2003 PERFORMANCE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS,
available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/pdufa/report2003/default.htm (last visited March 19, 2006).
5 US Department of Health and Human Services, HHS TASK FORCE ON DRUG IMPORTATION: REPORT ON PRESCRIPTION
DRUG IMPORTATION 37-38 (December 2004).
6 Benjamin A. Drabiak, Reimportation of prescription drugs: Long-lasting relief or a short-term analgesic? 4 WASH.
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 135, 143-144 (2005).
7 L. Gibson, Drug regulators study global treaty to tackle counterfeit drugs, 328 BRIT. MED. J. 486 (2004).
8 See, e.g., International Council of Nurses, COUNTERFEITS KILL (May 12, 2005), available at www.icn.ch.
9 Robert Cockburn, Paul N. Newton, E. Kyeremateng Agyarko, Dora Akunyili & Nicholas J. White, The Global Threat
of Counterfeit Drugs: Why Industry and Governments Must Communicate the Dangers, 2 PLOS MEDICINE 0302-0308
(April 2005), available at www.plosmedicine.org.
10 Id. at 0303-0304.
11 Pharmaceutical Security Institute, www.psi-inc.org (last visited March 19, 2006).
12 Personal correspondence with the author, October 4, 2004.

For example, one widely-cited “fact” attributed to the WHO is the claim that
“[c]ounterfeit medicines make up more than 10% of the global medicines
available in the market” 13 and “WHO estimates that one in ten medicines
sold worldwide is fake, with no medical effect whatsoever. In developing
countries, up to 25% of the medicines used are counterfeit or substandard.
Some estimates place the annual earnings from counterfeit medicines at over
$32 billion globally.” 14 Another example is the often-repeated claim that
“[t]he World Health Organization (WHO) figures suggest that developing
countries account for around 60% of all reported cases of counterfeit and
substandard drugs.” 15 But the WHO doesn’t really defend this figure when
pressed, and generally cites figures from the US FDA.
In the U.S., the FDA cites the WHO figures for global counterfeiting
estimates. Domestically, the FDA estimates that less than 1% of U.S. drugs
are counterfeit, but “officials admit that this figure is not based on any
scientific studies.” 16 European officials also rely on the WHO estimates.
The Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe said “WHO
estimates that counterfeit medicines make up for 8% to 10% of the European
pharmaceutical market and in some countries even as much as 12%.” 17
The pharmaceutical industry historically was reticent to discuss
counterfeiting, for obvious reasons. With the advent of consumer drug
purchasing over the internet, suddenly the industry was faced with crossborder arbitrage pressure. 18 After consumer focus groups identified safety
as a primary concern with internet drug purchases, the industry and the FDA
began to publicly discuss the problem. Publicly discussing counterfeiting is

13 International Council of Nurses, COUNTERFEITS KILL at 5 (May 12, 2005) available at www.icn.ch.
14 Id. at 38 (citing World Health Organization (2003). Fact Sheet no. 275, SUBSTANDARD AND COUNTERFEIT
MEDICINES).
15 Id. at 11 (citing World Health Organization (2004) ESSENTIAL DRUGS AND MEDICINES POLICY, Overview).
16 Elizabeth Cady Brown, Pharmaceutical Fakery, LONG ISLAND PRESS, June 9, 2005, available at
http://www.longislandpress.com/?cp=188&show=article&a_id=4250 (last visited March 19, 2006).
17 Maud de Boer-Buquicchio, Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Opening speech on the occasion of
the seminar “Counteract the counterfeiters!”, Limiting the risks of counterfeit medicines to public health in Europe by
adequate measures and mechanisms (Sept. 21, 2005), available at
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/press/News/2005/20050921_disc_sga.asp.
18

Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note , at

.

an important tool to enforce the industry’s price discrimination structures
across borders, enhancing overall industry profits. 19
To remedy this insufficient data, the federal government should fund
independent market surveillance to identify and describe problems with the
U.S. drug supply chain. Randomized purchases should be made across the
U.S. market, in various channels, and the purchased drugs should be tested
in all regards for compliance with U.S. law. When non-compliance is found,
investigators should track the problems back to the source. The full results
must then be transparently available to all researchers and the public.
Similar undertakings could occur in other countries on a recurring basis.
Market surveillance on this level would provide the basic facts necessary to
truly understand the threat to our drug supply, and to separate public
relations campaigns from genuine threats to public health.
II.

A New Pharmaceutical Lexicon Is Needed

One of the most important challenges is unpacking what is meant by the
terms fake or counterfeit drugs. The WHO has a widely-disseminated
definition which emphasizes deliberate mislabeling as to identity or
source. 20 Less precise terms are used in press accounts 21 and by the U.S.
and E.U. drug regulatory agencies. 22 In some cases, the terms fake or
19

Id. at .

20 World Health Organization. FACT SHEET NO. 275: SUBSTANDARD AND COUNTERFEIT MEDICINES (November 2003),
available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/2003/fs275/en (“Counterfeit medicines are part of the broader
phenomenon of substandard pharmaceuticals. The difference is that they are deliberately and fraudulently mislabeled
with respect to identity and/or source. Counterfeiting can apply to both branded and generic products and counterfeit
medicines may include products with the correct ingredients but fake packaging, with the wrong ingredients, without
active ingredients or with insufficient active ingredients.”). The FDA definition is broader, including drugs with
improper dosages, sub-potent or super-potent ingredients, or contamination. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA’S
COUNTERFEIT DRUG TASK FORCE INTERIM REPORT 5 (2003), available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/counterfeit/report/interim_report.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2004). This definition
conflates counterfeits with poorly manufactured or stored product.
21 See, e.g. CBSNews.com, Prescription for Danger: Counterfeit Drug Trade Grows, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/01/31/health/main327265.shtml (Aug. 2, 2001) (“There is no single definition
for counterfeit drugs. They may contain dangerous substitutes instead of the real ingredients. Or they may be much like
‘the real thing’—only expired, or not approved for sale in the [United States].”).
22 For discussion of the FDA’s definition, see EXAMINING THE IMPLICATIONS OF DRUG IMPORTATION: HEARING BEFORE
THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMM.,

108th Cong. (2004) (statement of William K. Hubbard, U.S. FDA Associate

counterfeit have included a wide range of drug products, from criminal acts
of homicide, to placebos, to safe and effective drugs from Canada.
These terms are frequently conflated in unhelpful ways. For example, an
August 10, 2004 article on Internet drug purchases in the Wall Street Journal
used the words fake or counterfeit many times before mentioning that FDA
lab tests “showed that most of the drugs contained too much active
ingredient, making the fakes potentially harmful.” 23 These drugs may be
poorly produced, or too strong by U.S. standards, but they should not be
lumped together with criminal counterfeits.24 Each of these categories
feature distinct causes, effects, and potential remedies. Conflating these
categories needlessly confuses the issues. The following sections begin the
process of building a pharmaceutical lexicon that is more descriptive and
helpful.
A.

The Good

Commissioner for Policy and Planning), available at http://www.fda.gov/ola/2004/importeddrugs0714.html. See also
Heather Won Tesoriero, Fake-Drug Sites Keep a Step Ahead, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2004, at D4 (describing generic
versions which were substituted for brand name drugs still patented in the United States as “counterfeits”); OPTIONS
FOR SAFE AND EFFECTIVE PRESCRIPTION DRUG IMPORTATION: HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE,

SCIENCE, & TRANSPORTATION, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Mark McClellan, Commissioner of the FDA),
available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1105&wit_id=3132 (discussing “unapproved,
imported pharmaceuticals” and “unsafe and illegal drugs” along with “ineffective, counterfeit” drugs). See also FDA,
COUNTERFEIT DRUG TASK FORCE INTERIM REPORT 5-7 (2003),
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/counterfeit/report/interim_report.html (noting that counterfeit drugs may “pose
significant public health and safety concerns,” as they “may contain only inactive ingredients, incorrect ingredients,
improper dosages, sub-potent or super-potent ingredients, or be contaminated.”); Eur. Fed’n of Pharm. Indus. & Ass’ns,
International Exhaustion of Trade Mark Rights 7 (2001) (describing the range of products that may be considered
counterfeit by the WHO and the European pharmaceutical trade association and corresponding concerns).
23 Heather Won Tesoriero, Fake-Drug Sites Keep a Step Ahead, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2004, at D4. See also Mark
McClellan, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Com., Sci. & Transp., March 11, 2004 (discussing
“unapproved, imported pharmaceuticals” and “unsafe and illegal drugs” with “ineffective, counterfeit” drugs)
(McClellan was at the time the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration; he currently heads the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services).
24 The trade association of European pharmaceutical research companies and the WHO use the broader definition.
Eur. Fed’n of Pharmaceutical Industries & Ass’n, International Exhaustion of Trade Mark Rights 5 (April 2001). My
point is not to argue who’s definition is “right,” but to demonstrate the analysis which is possible when using a
narrower definition.

Good drugs are safe, effective and less expensive, but violate some technical
requirement of US law. A prime example is prescription drugs purchased by
US citizens from brick and mortar pharmacies in Canada. The purchase is
legal, but the FDA states that bringing these drugs back into the US violates
federal law. 25 These are safe and effective drugs purchased in person in
Canada, but the consumer violates the US personal importation rule by
bringing back to the US for personal use. 26
In many important respects these drugs should not be confused with
contaminated products peddled by criminal gangs. The first difference is
safety and efficacy. Canadian drugs are just as safe and effective as drugs
sold in the US market. 27 In fact, they are more effective because they are
cheaper. Patient compliance with prescription drug regimes is higher when
the drugs are affordable. 28
The FDA studiously avoids this important point about financial access to
drugs, despite the fact that financial access is the primary reason for the
Canadian cross-border prescription drug trade. This leads to the second
distinction: this trade is not driven by criminals. Law abiding individuals
seek treatment for themselves or relatives. US residents fill prescriptions in
Canada because the products appear fungible with a transparent price
differential.
The primary negative effect of Canadian cross-border foot traffic is the lost
pharmaceutical patent rents. The patent-based pharmaceutical companies
make a smaller profit when the prices are lower. Evaluation of whether this
trade is socially positive must balance the benefits from more affordable
drug access (static gains) against the potential dynamic losses from reduced
patent rents. The dynamic effects may be positive if indeed current U.S.
25 Prescription Drug Marketing Act
26

Many critics conflate this foot-traffic market, which is undoubtedly safe, with purchasing from internet
sites claiming to be from Canada. These are entirely different markets, with very different profiles on
safety and efficacy.
27 Drugs purchased in person from a traditional Canadian pharmacy are fully covered by the Canadian drug regulatory
system and may actually be safer than similar drugs purchased in the U.S. Ram Kamath & Scott McKibbin, Ill. Office
of Special Advocate for Prescription Drugs, REPORT ON FEASIBILITY OF EMPLOYEES AND RETIREES SAFELY AND
EFFECTIVELY PURCHASING PRESCRIPTION DRUGS FROM CANADIAN PHARMACIES 11-16 (2003) (finding Canadian and
U.S. systems equivalent for most aspects, but finding the Canadian system superior in preventing the introduction of
counterfeit drugs and incident reporting for internal process errors).
28 Health Affairs

prices are supra-optimal. 29 Social welfare is improved if the market expands
by selling therapeutically-equivalent drugs to lower-income populations with
highly elastic demand curves. Whether parallel trade is a net gain is
unknown. Most studies ignore the effect of lower prices in improving
access, 30 as well as the larger question of global optimality of
pharmaceutical patent rents.
A second example of a Good drug is the unlicensed generic antiretroviral
(ARV) drugs produced to address the AIDS treatment crisis in low- and
medium-income countries. The Brazilian health minister threatened to issue
a compulsory license for a 2nd generation AIDS drug, Kaletra. 31 US trade
officials responded with quite intemperate language. A compromise was
reached before the compulsory license was issued. 32 Likewise, access to
ARVs in Africa and other low-income populations was made possible when
several companies and groups produced and used unlicensed generic
ARVs. 33 Many of these drugs were pre-qualified by the WHO. 34 Some
have now even been approved by the FDA, 35 and yet they violate intellectual
property (IP) law. These drugs provide affordable access to millions of
people with AIDS.
B.

The Bad

Bad drugs include blatant attempts to defraud consumers by selling placebos
lacking the correct active ingredient, or drugs containing negligent or
deliberate contaminants or poisons. 36
29 Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in Int’l Prescription Drug Markets,
5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193 (2005). [hereinafter, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage]
30 Peter West & James Mahon, BENEFITS TO PAYERS AND PATIENTS FROM PARALLEL TRADE (May 2003) (unpubished
working paper, on file with the York Health Econ. Consortium) (estimating direct savings of € 631 million in 2002
from legal pharmaceutical arbitrage (parallel trade) within the EU) (funded by a grant from European parallel traders);
Panos Kanavos et al., THE ECONONMIC IMPACT OF PHARMACEUTICAL PARALLEL TRADE IN EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER
STATES: A STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 15-16 (London Sch. of Econ. & Pol. Sci., Special Res. Paper, 2004),
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/LSEHealthAndSocialCare/documents/otherpaperseries.htm.
31 Benson, T. 2005. Brazil and U.S. maker reach deal on AIDS drug. NEW YORK TIMES, July 9, 2005
32 Benson, T. 2005. Brazil and U.S. maker reach deal on AIDS drug. NEW YORK TIMES, July 9, 2005.
33 Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note , at .
34 Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note , at .
35 Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note , at .
36 Bryan A. Liang, Fade to Black: Importation and Counterfeit Drugs, 32 Am. J.L. & Med. (2006).

Bad drugs are produced and marketed by criminals. The products are at best
placebos and at worst positively dangerous. Patients derive no therapeutic
benefit whatsoever; all money spent on them is wasted. Nothing of social
value is produced. This trade deserves the enhanced criminal sanctions that
Bryan Liang and others call for. 37 However, applying these criminal laws to
Good or Ugly drugs would be a mistake, misdirecting resources to attack a
market with some social value.
C.

The Ugly

Ugly drugs are generally safe and effective but come to the consumer
through an insecure supply chain or with other deficiencies which may or
may not represent a safety risk. Ugly drugs are intended to be therapeutic
and legitimate, but are sub-standard in some way, such as labeling which
complies with Canadian or EU law but not U.S. FDA standards.
Ugly drugs present an entirely different profile than Bad drugs. These
manufacturers and wholesalers are not criminals. They may be resourceconstrained or require enhanced procedures at the plant and in the supply
chain. They may even be negligent by US standards; but they are not
criminals.
Foreign drugs which are imported into the US with foreign-language
labeling present an example of an Ugly drug with possibly positive social
value. About 12 million people in the United States are linguistically
isolated. 38 For limited-English proficiency (LEP) populations, receiving a
prescription with the proper U.S. FDA labels is practically useless. 39 For
example, it would be better for a recent LEP immigrant from the Philippines
to import a drug from home because not only is it cheaper, but the label in
Tagalog is both readable and culturally competent. The indicated solution
here would either be to permit importation in foreign language labels for
LEP communities or to permit dual-language labeling for these
communities.

37 Id.
38 US Census Bureau, LANGUAGE USE AND ENGLISH-SPEAKING ABILITY: 2000 (Oct. 2003).
39 Health Affairs

Ugly drugs might also include products imported from legitimate internet
pharmacies. Empirical evidence suggests that virtually none of the internet
drugs arriving in the United States are non-functional counterfeits; their
importation simply violates technical restrictions on parallel importation,
FDA labeling, or similar rules. 40 Instead, most of the non-functional
counterfeit drugs in the United States appear to have domestic origins or
domestic networks. 41 The cause of this trade is simply the price differentials
across borders. The preferred solution of the FDA is to shut the trade
down. 42 Criminal counterfeiting must be recognized as a major threat to the
integrity of our health care system and must be shut down. But the Ugly
drug trade is not necessarily a criminal enterprise. An alternative is to
legalize and regulate it, bringing this trade out of the grey market. The
Dorgan-Snowe Bill in Congress 43 and State-based importation plans, such as
I-Save Rx, 44 are prominent examples of this approach. Mindlessly
conflating criminal placebos with importation under Dorgan-Snowe only
serves the interest of drug company profits rather than a serious discussion
of public health.
III. Intellectual Property Laws Are An Underlying Cause of
Counterfeit Drugs

40 See, e.g., Press Release, FDA, RECENT FDA/U.S. CUSTOMS IMPORT BLITZ EXAMS CONTINUE TO REVEAL
POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS ILLEGALLY IMPORTED DRUG SHIPMENTS (Jan. 27, 2004) (mentioning many categories of
unapproved drugs but never indicating that any of them contained no active ingredient). FDA, Counterfeit Drug Task
Force Interim Report 5-7 (2003), http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/counterfeit/report/interim_report.html (noting that
counterfeit drugs may “pose significant public health and safety concerns,” as they “may contain only inactive
ingredients, incorrect ingredients, improper dosages, sub-potent or super-potent ingredients, or be contaminated.”);
European Federation of Pharm. Indus. & Ass’ns, INTERNATIONAL EXHAUSTION OF TRADE MARK RIGHTS 7 (2001)
(describing the range of products that may be considered counterfeit by the WHO and the European pharmaceutical
trade association and corresponding concerns).
41 Gilbert M. Gaul & Mary Pat Flaherty, U.S. Prescription Drug System Under Attack: Multibillion-Dollar Shadow
Market Is Growing Stronger, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2003, at A1.
42 See EXAMINING THE IMPLICATIONS OF DRUG IMPORTATION: HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., 108th
Cong. (2004) (statement of William K. Hubbard, U.S. FDA Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning),
available at http://www.fda.gov/ola/2004/importeddrugs0714.html.
43 S.334, 109th Cong. (2005) (A bill to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act with respect to the
importation of prescription drugs, and for other purposes).
44 See Kamath & McKibbin, supra note (describing the Illinois program).

One outcome of enhanced lexical precision will be a sharper focus on the
most dangerous areas of concern: Bad drugs sold by criminals. It also
permits us to focus on the underlying cause, which is the legal system of
intellectual property (IP) for patented drugs.
An underlying cause of counterfeit drugs is the IP system, particularly
patents and trademarks. Criminals follow the money. They typically
counterfeit expensive patented drugs rather than generics. 45 The IP system
creates the opportunity which counterfeiters exploit.
The marginal cost of producing most name-brand drugs is a small fraction of
the commercial price. An annual supply of a well-known antiretroviral
triple combination drug regime in the United States costs over $11,000. 46
The marginal price is not publicly known, but can be estimated. Unlicensed
generic companies sell the same drugs in sub-Saharan Africa for $244 per
year. 47 These drugs are sold at 45 times their marginal cost (a “pricing
ratio” of 45:1). This ratio would not be possible absent IP laws and the
related branding efforts of drug companies. High pricing ratios attract
counterfeiters.
This is not an isolated example. Many patented drugs exhibit this profile
(see Table 1). Industry estimates suggest that the average variable cost of
patented drugs accounts for an average of 15% of the final price, 48 yielding
an average pricing ratio of more than 6:1. Some pricing ratios are much
higher: generic ciprofloxacin is sold in some places at less than 0.4% of the
price of the most expensive sources in the U.S., a pricing ratio of 246:1. 49
Others have found pricing ratios of 200:1 in global markets for vaccines and
contraceptives. 50

45 In some uncompetitive generic drug markets, even generics might sell at a substantial premium over the marginal
cost of production, and thus attracting counterfeiters. This uncompetitive market may well be related to a hang-over
effect from related pharmaceutical laws, even with the expiration of the patent.
46 Data from drugstore.com for the triple drug combination 3TC/4dT/NVP.
47 MSF, Untangling the Web [pincite]
48 J. Watal & F.M. Scherer, Post-TRIPS Options for Access to Patented Medicines in Developing Countries, 5 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 913-939 (2002).
49 Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note , at 254-55.
50 S. Moon & E. t’Hoen, Pills and Pocketbooks: Equity Pricing of Essential Medicines in Developing Countries
(2001), available at www.accessmed-msf.org/upload/ReportsandPublications.

Table 1. Rx Pricing Ratios
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Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, 5 Yale J H Pol’y, L & Ethics 193 (2005).

By way of comparison, one of us (KO) has previously estimated the pricing
ratio for cocaine at 25:1.51 The potential returns from parallel importation of
some patented drugs are higher than cocaine by an order of magnitude.
Patented drugs are especially attractive if the markets are less crowded and
law enforcement is less diligent. 52
The story gets worse. These ratios are built by comparing safe and effective
versions of a drug sold in different markets. All of these pricing ratios
assume that the criminal intends to deliver actual functional
pharmaceuticals. This assumption is generally true in illegal narcotic
markets. When criminals market cocaine, they need to deliver the expected
(and observable) biochemical effect:
customers want to get high.
Delivering a placebo will not only destroy customer loyalty and repeat
business, but it may also result in violence.

51 Comparison of the street price in producing countries and the street price in the US. Pharmaceutical Arbitrage,
supra note , at 262.
52 Brian Liang and others have decried the poor law enforcement resources dedicated to pharmaceutical counterfeiting.
Bryan A. Liang, supra note

.

However, many patented drugs do not deliver an effect which is
immediately observable to the patient. If a patient takes a placebo instead of
atorvastatin calcium (Lipitor), the patient may not notice the lack of
therapeutic effect for months.53 By the time it is noticed, it may be very
difficult to re-trace the supply chain to the point where the counterfeit was
introduced. Some commentators reluctantly acknowledge that counterfeit
drugs are something of a “perfect crime.” 54
For drugs that do not produce an immediately observable therapeutic effect,
criminals need not go to the trouble to procure and ship the actual drugs.
Any placebo will do, at a fraction of the cost of either obtaining the correct
API to manufacture pills, or obtaining cheaper versions of the medicine via
parallel trade. Criminal enterprises may be increasingly involved in
pharmaceutical counterfeiting. 55
At this point the reader may complain that blaming the IP system for
counterfeiting is akin to blaming the law for crime. 56 That position may not
be as controversial as it may first appear. The Apostle Paul, writing to the
Church in Rome said: “And where there is no law there is no
transgression” 57 and “Indeed I would not have known what sin was except
through the law. For I would not have known what coveting really was if
the law had not said, ‘Do not covet.’” 58 However, we are not opening a
discussion of law and sin. The narrower point is that if the ostensible goal of
pharmaceutical IP law is to promote innovation, then counterfeiting
demonstrates that the law is ill-suited to achieving that goal. This is
especially true if alternatives are available which fund R&D without creating
the pricing ratios found attractive by counterfeiters.

53 For other drugs, such as analgesics or erectile dysfunction drugs, it may well be possible for the patient to quickly
identify the therapeutic failure. But if the counterfeit drug was introduced into the supply chain at an unknown point, it
might still be difficult to find the counterfeiter.
54 L. Kontnik, PHARMACEUTICAL COUNTERFEITING: PREVENTING THE PERFECT CRIME 2 (2004), available at
http://www.fffenterprises.com/web_files/fff_wht_ppr_111804.pdf (last visited January 10, 2005).
55 Alliance Against Counterfeiting & Piracy, supra note , at 2 (“This document provides clear and unambiguous
evidence of organised crime controlling, exploiting and benefiting from intellectual property fraud. It is on the
increase.”).
56
57 Romans 4:14b (New International Version).
58 Romans 7:7b.

A.
Counterfeiting Is A Major Threat To Pharmaceutical
Innovation
Counterfeits are an immanent danger to innovation. While the FDA still
considers it a relatively rare practice, 59 counterfeiting is nevertheless
growing rapidly in the United States and in other high-income markets. 60 In
2000, the estimated value of EU pharmaceutical counterfeiting was more
than 1.5 billion Euros. In 2003, the United Kingdom-based AntiCounterfeiting Group estimated that 5.8% of pharmaceutical company
annual revenue is lost due to counterfeiting, 61 and recent estimates range
even higher. 62 Given a pharmaceutical global market exceeding $500 billion,
the total lost to counterfeiting may exceed $30 billion per year. If true,
counterfeiting is a major threat not only to public health, but also to
innovation, far outstripping the limited potential damage from government
reimbursement systems and equitable access programs.
B.
Government Reimbursement Systems In High-Income
Countries Are A Less Significant Threat
The patent-based drug industry argues that European-style government
reimbursement systems threaten pharmaceutical innovation. The industry
and the US Department of Commerce have attacked high-income countries
for their price-conscious reimbursement systems for drugs, labeling these

59 FDA, COUNTERFEIT DRUG TASK FORCE INTERIM REPORT 3 (2003).
60 The FDA estimates that pharmaceutical counterfeiting has increased four-fold in the past few years. See, e.g., Mary
Pat Flaherty & Gilbert M. Gaul, Anti-Counterfeit Steps Drugmakers Sought: Legislators’ Goal Is To Halt Illegal Sales,
WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2004, at A11; Mary Pat Flaherty & Gilbert M. Gaul, Miami Man Charged with Selling
Counterfeit Lipitor, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2003, at E1; Mary Pat Flaherty & Gilbert M. Gaul, Lax System Allows
Criminals To Invade the Supply Chain, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2003, at A1. These articles were part of a series of
articles on counterfeit drugs by Mary Pat Flaherty and Gilbert M. Gaul that ran in the Washington Post during Fall
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efforts as “price controls.” 63 Name calling of this sort ignores the fact that
many US government programs employ similar or more restrictive
techniques, including Medicaid, the US Public Health Service, the Veteran’s
Administration, or the Federal Supply Schedule. 64 The sum of the allegedly
lost patent rents equals no more than $7.5 billion per year, 65 and is likely to
be much smaller, as low as $355 million. 66 In any case, these numbers are
much smaller than the pharmaceutical patent rents lost to counterfeiting.
C.
Alternatives To Patent-Based R&D Cost Recovery May
Eliminate The Incentive To Counterfeit
A possible solution to reduce the incentive to counterfeit would be to
remove R&D costs from the retail pricing system. Generally, these
proposals fund R&D as a global public good through a variety of
approaches. A prominent example of this approach is the Hubbard-Love
R&D Treaty. 67 Broadly similar approaches are currently being discussed at
the WHO Executive Board. 68 Supporters generally seek to enhance
financial access to patented pharmaceuticals by low- and medium-income
populations.
If R&D cost recovery is removed from the retail price system, then the
pricing ratios described above collapse. All medicines would be sold
essentially as generics. This result satisfies the access needs of the poor, and
it also destroys the vast majority of the incentive to counterfeit. The best
63 US Dept. of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Pharmaceutical Price Controls in OECD
Countries: Implications for U.S. Consumers, Pricing, Research and Development, and Innovation (Dec.
2004) [hereinafter, the Commerce Department Study].
64 Testimony of Kevin Outterson, Associate Professor, West Virginia University, Before the Committee on Health,
Education, Labor & Pensions, United States Senate, Hearing On: Drug Importation: Would the Price Be Right?
February 17, 2005.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See, e.g., Tim Hubbard, ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRICE SYSTEM (Presentation at Columbia University, Dec. 4, 2003),
available at http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/cgsd/accesstomedicines_papers.html; James Love, Presentation at
Columbia University: A NEWTRADE FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL HEALTHCARE R&D (Dec. 4, 2003), available at
http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/cgsd/accesstomedicines_papers.html. A recent treatment of these subject is
Peter Drahos, An Alternative Framework for the Global Regulation of Intellectual Property Rights (Centre for
Governance of Knowledge and Development, Working Paper No. 1: October 2005) (forthcoming in Austrian Journal
of Development Studies) available at http://cgkd.anu.edu.au/menus/publications.php#drahos.
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solution to the scourge of counterfeit drugs may involve radical examination
of our society’s reliance on IP law for recovery of pharmaceutical R&D
costs.
CONCLUSION
Very little is really known about the scope and nature of counterfeit drugs.
Congress should obtain real facts before it criminalizes behavior which may
be socially valuable. We need data on counterfeiting which is free from
industry control and bias. Our primary focus should be protecting our
pharmaceutical supply chain from criminal counterfeiters that serve no
positive social value. This problem also presents an opportunity to reevaluate the foundations of the pharmaceutical IP systems to see if a better
world is possible.

